This paper studies determinants and effects of firms' participation in the 33/50 program, a voluntary pollution reduction program (VPR) initiated by government regulators. We examine a wide range of explanations for voluntary corporate environmentalism and find evidence in support of an "enforcement theory" that predicts: (i) VPR participation is rewarded by relaxed regulatory scrutiny; (ii) the anticipation of this reward spurs firms to participate in the program; and (iii) the program rewards regulators with reduced pollution. We also find that 33/50 participation was more likely for firms operating in states with larger environmentalist constituencies. of an "enforcement theory" that predicts: (i) VPR participation is rewarded by relaxed regulatory scrutiny; (ii) the anticipation of this reward spurs firms to participate in the program; and (iii) the program rewards regulators with reduced pollution. We also find that 33/50 participation was more likely for firms operating in states with larger environmentalist constituencies.
decrease carbon dioxide emissions, and the "National Environmental Performance Track," designed to encourage environmentally proactive firms through rewards and public recognition.
Economists have offered a number of theories to explain why profit-driven firms volunteer for costly pollution reduction efforts. Arora and Gangopadhyay (AG, 1995) argue that firms want to attract a clientele of "green consumers" willing to pay more for goods produced in an environmentally friendly way (see also Arora and Cason (AC), 1996) . Voluntary pollution reductions may also deter lobbying by environmental groups for tighter regulatory standards (Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett (MLH), 2000) ; spur tighter environmental standards that "raise rivals'
costs" (Salop and Scheffman, 1983; Innes and Bial, 2002) ; avoid future environmental liability;
and/or deter boycotts by environmental interest groups (Baron, 2001; Innes, 2006) .
Another potential motive for voluntary environmentalism is to lessen the scrutiny of environmental authorities, reducing the frequency of costly environmental inspections and enforcement actions. The EPA officially claims that such rewards were not offered to 33/50 program participants. 1 Nevertheless, such rewards, promised implicitly if not officially, may represent an optimal government policy to promote participation in a voluntary pollution reduction program (VPR). The societal benefit of a VPR is to prompt participating firms to adopt management practices that reduce their costs of pollution abatement, leading ultimately to 1 On the 33/50 program, the EPA stated (EPA, 1992, p. 11) : "Participation in the program is enforcement neutral: a company will receive no special scrutiny if it elects not to participate and receive no relief from normal enforcement attention if it does elect to participate." However, in the recent "Performance Track" program, the EPA offers a number of explicit regulatory rewards to participants, including less frequent reporting requirements, more flexible air permits, and expedited reviews for water discharge permits (www.epa.gov/performancetrack). pollution reductions (Maxwell and Decker, 2006) . 2 While intuitively compelling, the empirical strength of this "enforcement theory" for VPRs has yet to be studied.
The purpose of this paper is to examine (1) the empirical validity of this enforcement-based spur to participation in the EPA's 33/50 program, among many other potential participation motives, and (2) the related effects of program participation on both a regulated firm's pollution levels and the government's enforcement activity. In studying these issues, we bridge two empirical literatures, one focusing on voluntary pollution reduction programs (e.g., AC; Khanna and Damon (KD), 1999; Videras and Alberini (VA), 2000; Anton, Deltas and Khanna, 2004 ) and the other investigating determinants and effects of government enforcement activities.
In the former literature, scholars study several determinants of participation in voluntary programs (AC, KD, VA) and, in addition, effects of the 33/50 program on pollution (KD; Vidovic and Khanna (VK), 2007) . They find that participation in 33/50 was motivated, in part, by green marketing and potential liability, with larger firms found to be more likely to participate (AC, KD, VA). KD find that 33/50 led to significant pollutant reductions; however, VK argue that this effect vanishes when accounting for time effects. In contrast to our focus, this literature does not study effects of voluntary over-compliance on government enforcement and does not consider potential effects of boycott threats or incentives for regulatory preemption (MLH) or liability law. 3 We thus 2 Maxwell and Decker (2006) show that a reduced probability of enforcement may result from a firm's adoption of abatement-cost-reducing investments, thus spurring these investments apriori.
Miceli and Segerson (1998) also stress benefits of voluntary pollution reduction programs in lessening tensions and facilitating negotiations between enforcement agencies and polluting firms.
3 In this literature, the only study that allows for any enforcement effects is VA. VA consider the potential impact of prior RCRA corrective actions on 33/50 participation, finding some evidence examine a more complete range of possible explanations for voluntary pollution abatement efforts than in prior work and, in doing so, find evidence for enforcement, boycott deterrence, and regulatory preemption motives for voluntary efforts, but no "green marketing" incentive effects.
In addition, unlike others, we study the timing of the 33/50 program's impacts, permitting us to identify when it was effective in reducing pollution. In doing so, we consider time effects (like VK), but examine a broader array of manufacturing firms.
A second literature studies determinants of the government's environmental enforcement activity, and its impact on pollution (e.g., Magat and Viscusi, 1990; Gray and Deily, 1996; Nadeau, 1997) . Most closely related to our study are papers that focus on the government's strategic use of enforcement tools to leverage desired conduct from regulated firms. Harrington (1988) argues that the apparent paradox of low and infrequent regulatory fines for environmental violations can be explained by the targeting of enforcement resources to "bad" firms that prompts desired conduct from "good" firms, despite low penalties for "good" firms' violations. 4 Helland (1998) studies an additional basis for targeting, the extent of a firm's self-reporting of violations. that such enforcement actions make participation more likely. We study the impact of both regulatory inspections and enforcement actions and, unlike VA, also model program impacts on pollution and government enforcement activity. MLH study potential effects of environmental constituencies on statewide pollution aggregates; we consider effects of environmental constituencies on both 33/50 participation and pollution decisions at a firm level.
4 See also related work by Harford and Harrington (1991) and Heyes and Rickman (1999) . In addition, consistent with this theory, Decker (2005) finds that government inspection activity responds to reductions in reported toxic pollutant releases as well as reductions in regulated pollutant releases and a good statutory compliance history. Decker (2003) studies an additional reward that may be offered to "good" firms --more rapid environmental permitting for new source construction. Both find evidence that these regulatory tools are exploited in enforcement practice. We find evidence that regulators use another instrument to target their enforcement activities: a firm's participation in voluntary pollution reduction programs.
II. THE 33/50 PROGRAM Started in 1991, the 33/50 program was the EPA's first formal effort to achieve voluntary pollution reductions by regulated firms. The program sought to reduce releases of seventeen toxic chemicals by a third by 1992 and by 50 percent by 1995, measured from 1988 baseline levels. The seventeen 33/50 chemicals are listed in Appendix A. Roughly seventy percent of the 33/50 chemicals (by 1988 weight of releases) were air pollutants (AC). Two of the chemicals (carbon tetrachloride and 1,1,1-trichloroethane) depleted the stratospheric ozone layer and, hence, came under the Montreal Protocol's provisions for the phase-out of such substances; however, these two chemicals represented less than fifteen percent of total 33/50 releases (in 1988).
The EPA initiated the 33/50 program shortly after creating the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), a database compiling information on toxic releases of all firms with ten or more employees producing one or more of 320 targeted pollutants. In early 1991, the EPA invited the 509 companies emitting the largest volume of 33/50 pollutants to participate in the program; these companies were responsible for over three-quarters of total 33/50 releases as of 1988. In July 1991, the 4534 other companies with reported 33/50 releases in 1988 were asked to participate as well. With additional enrollments through 1995, the EPA invited a total of 10,167 firms to join the 33/50 program, and 1294 firms accepted. The latter program participants accounted for 58.8 percent of 33/50 releases in 1990. In this paper, we focus exclusively on firms that were eligible for the 33/50 program in 1991, those invited in March and July of that year.
The 33/50 program was purely voluntary and its pollution reduction targets were not enforceable. Despite the absence of apparent regulatory teeth, the EPA (1999) cites some aggregate statistics as indicators of the program's success. Among reporting firms, total 33/50 releases declined by over 52 percent between 1990 and 1996, and net 33/50 releases, excluding the two ozone-depleting compounds, declined by over 45 percent. In contrast, non-33/50 TRI releases fell by 25.3 percent over this period. Moreover, rates of 33/50 release reductions were greater for program participants (down 59.3 percent between 1990 and 1996) than for non-participants (down 42.9 percent over the same interval). However, these numbers may mask other hidden determinants of firms' pollution; participating firms may have been more apt to reduce pollution, regardless of participation in the 33/50 program.
III. HYPOTHESES
Participation in the 33/50 program, while involving no enforceable commitment, required a firm to file a plan documenting how it proposed to reduce its emissions of target pollutants.
Indeed, more than 82 percent of participants stipulated specific pollution reduction targets. In addition, the program was accompanied by some technical assistance to aid participants in realizing their target emission reductions (Khanna and Damon, 1999) . The process of planning for emissions reductions, including possible managerial changes and environmental auditing procedures, could yield the pollution reductions that were the program's objective.
Although the EPA stressed the public recognition that participation could bring, there is little evidence that such recognition occurred in the broader public; 5 indeed, only with effort could a researcher obtain the names of program participants. However, to spur 33/50 participation and 5 The EPA (1992) states that its "partnership programs offer recognition ... that can enhance corporate image with customers, regulators, neighbors, and the media." associated pollution abatement innovations, the EPA could have afforded participants a more cooperative / less adversarial treatment of potential infractions, with fewer costly inspections and enforcement actions -over and beyond reductions in enforcement rates due to reduced pollution (Maxwell and Decker, 2006) . 6 The value of this regulatory reward to 33/50 participation is expected to have been higher for firms that otherwise anticipated greater regulatory scrutiny. (c) had a greater incentive and ability to preempt regulation because it was a larger firm and operated in states with larger environmentalist constituencies (regulatory preemption); (d) was more exposed to potential liability because it was larger (with deeper pockets) and/or operated in strict liability states (liability); and 6 Firms may be averse to inspections and enforcement actions, not only because of their direct costs, but also because of their potential to ignite adverse public reaction in the media and financial markets (e.g., Hamilton, 1995) .
(e) was in a more concentrated industry and invested more in research and development (strategic and cost effects).
For "green marketing," a firm's ability to establish a market niche for goods produced in an environmentally friendly way is tied to its proximity to consumers (AC, KD, VA); we therefore follow KD in measuring this link using a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm sold a product directly to final consumers (FG for "final good"). To test for incentives to deter consumer boycotts by environmental interest groups (Baron, 2001; Innes, 2006; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996) , we construct a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if a firm is in an industry that was contemporaneously targeted for boycott. 7 We denote this variable BC.
Incentives for regulatory preemption arise when voluntary corporate environmentalism can deter environmental interest groups from lobbying for tighter environmental regulations (Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett, 2000) . Because these incentives are likely to be greater in states with larger environmental constituencies (where the public sensitivity to a firm's pollution is likely to be greater, as is environmental groups' ability to successfully lobby the government for change), we control for them using the per-capita Sierra Club membership in a plant's home state (SIERRA), averaged across plants to obtain a firm-level variable.
7 The 1992-1993 issue of the National Boycott News lists products subject to contemporaneous organized consumer boycott, including over 400 products made by over 100 firms. If a firm or plant in our sample is in an industry that produces a targeted product (based on the firm's or plant's primary SIC classification), our boycott variable is assigned a value of one for that firm or plant. In practice, boycotts are rare, as theory predicts (Baron, 2001) . In fact, none of the firms in our sample were actually boycotted. Hence, our boycott variable attempts to measure the potential likelihood that a firm might face a boycott threat.
Building on Alberini and Austin (1999), we capture the liability motive for pollution reduction using a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a plant's home state has strict (vs. negligence) environmental liability (STRICT); for a firm, this variable is constructed by averaging these zero-one values for the firm's plants.
Finally, we include measures of industry concentration (the Herfindahl index, HERF) and firm-level R&D expenditures (R&D) to control for a number of relevant forces. A researchintensive firm in a more concentrated industry is potentially more prone to voluntary environmentalism as a strategy to prompt tighter pollution standards that disadvantage the firm's rivals (Salop and Scheffman, 1983; Innes and Bial, 2002) . In addition, more concentrated industries are better able to coordinate in the preemption of regulation (Maxwell, et al., 2000) , and R&D can directly lower costs of pollutant abatement, both favoring 33/50 participation and pollution reduction.
IV. THE DATA
We estimate four equations in order to explain (1) firms' participation in the 33/50 program (in 1991); (2) firms' annual emissions of 33/50 pollutants (toxicity weighted, 1989-1995) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) and state GDP growth rates (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) Tables 1 and 2 present variable definitions and descriptive statistics for our sample. From Table 2 , we can compare attributes of 33/50 program participants to those of non-participants.
Under the null of equal mean values, the calculated z statistics are asymptotically distributed as standard normals. In a statistical sense, most of the variables have significantly different means for participants than non-participants. In particular, participants were significantly larger (with higher weighted 33/50 releases and levels of employment), more research intensive (with higher levels of lagged R&D expenditure), and more likely to be in industries that were subject to boycotts.
Participants were also subject to more regulatory oversight. We use three variables to measure prior regulatory scrutiny: (i) the number of government inspections of firm facilities in 1989 -1990 , (ii) an indicator that takes a value of one if a firm had an enforcement action in the period 1989 -1990 , and (iii) the number of Superfund sites for which a firm is a potentially responsible party (PRP). Enforcement-driven rewards to 33/50 participation and pollution reductions are expected to have been greater for firms with more Superfund involvement, as measured by the PRP variable. For all three measures, Table 2 indicates that participants were subject to more prior enforcement scrutiny than non-participants, with more inspections, a higher likelihood of enforcement action, and more Superfund activity. These statistics provide some preliminary evidence for our Hypothesis 1.
Critics of the 33/50 program suggest that firms joined because their prior (1988) (1989) (1990) emission reductions already placed them in near reach of the program's goals (KD). We control for this effect by including a variable measuring a firm's 33/50 pollutant reductions from 1988 to 1990 (DIFREL). From Table 2 , we see that participants in our sample experienced significantly greater reductions in 33/50 releases prior to the program's onset (1988) (1989) (1990) ; however, as a proportion of 1988 releases, pre-program (1988-90) Table 3 reveals that participants experienced approximately a 16.5 percent greater reduction in releases from pre to post-program, half again as much as the entire release reduction experienced by non-participants. Similarly, while the average number of non-participant enforcement actions more than doubled (multiplied by over 2.57), corresponding participant enforcement numbers increased by less than fifty percent in the post-program years. And while non-participants experienced over an 8 percent rise in inspection rates from the pre to postprogram years, participants experienced a 6.6 percent decline. 10 These statistics are suggestive of the participation effects that we conjecture in Hypothesis 2.
V. ECONOMETRICS
(1) The Participation Equation.
We estimate a Probit model of firms' decisions to participate (or not) in the 33/50 program in 1991, using lagged cross-section explanatory data. 11 We control for industry effects by including dummy variables for the seven industries most heavily represented in our sample (SICs 28, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, and 38) . 11 We include all firms that had data in 1990, even those with fewer than three years of complete data. Hence, our sample for this equation contains six more companies than used in the other equations, for a total of 325 sample firms.
1879 company-year observations. We control for enforcement effects using a firm's lagged inspections-per-facility (LINSPFAC), and account for time effects by including year dummies. 12 On the econometrics, there are several issues. First, we consider both fixed and random effect specifications, and present a Hausman test for the alternatives. In the random effects model, we include our key industry dummies. In the fixed effects specification, we construct robust standard errors that (as with random effects) are clustered by facility.
Second, we wish to test for effects of participation in the 33/50 program on 33/50 releases.
As program participation occurred late in 1991, we model participation effects only from 1992 onwards. Although participation decisions were pre-determined in these years, there may nevertheless be sample selection bias; due to attributes that we do not observe in our data, 33/50 participants may have been more likely to reduce pollution even had they not joined the program (the endogenous treatment problem identified by Heckman (1978) ). If, as a result, the error in the participation equation is correlated with the error in the pollution equation, then using actual participation decisions in the pollution equation, without including a selection correction, leads to biased and inconsistent estimates. We allow our data to reveal such correlation by using actual participation decisions and constructing a selection correction (an augmented inverse Mills ratio, IMR). 13 Resulting coefficient estimates are consistent (Vella, 1998) .
12 We considered two alternative measures to capture time effects, a time (year) variable and time (year) dummies for all but one year of our sample. In all of our pollution equations, constraint tests reject the year variable restriction in favor of the time dummies, with p-values less than 0.001. Hence, we present results using year dummies.
13 The selection correction is achieved (following Vella, 1998) by constructing the fitted regressor, IMR ti , where IMR ti =0 for t≤1991 and, for t≥1992, Because participation effects may (or may not) wane over the course of the program, we measure distinct effects for each of the program years 1992-1995. This is done by constructing four participation variables that measure the incremental effect of participation on pollution in a given year; for example, the coefficient on the 1993 participation variable measures the pollution change from 1993 onwards that is attributable to a firm's 33/50 participation. 14 Finally, because we use a predicted regressor (the augmented IMR) to obtain consistent parameter estimates, standard error estimates obtained by conventional methods are inconsistent (Murphy and Topel, 1985) . To obtain consistent estimates of standard errors, we perform the Murphy-Topel correction. 14 Our four regressors are constructed as follows: If P t is our participation variable for year t (taking a value of zero for all years other than t) then we construct the regressors, P *  =  for over-dispersion and reject the mean-equal-variance constraint. For binary choice (Probit) models, fixed effects models are known to be unworkable (Greene, 2000) and, as a result, could not be estimated with our data. A well-known alternative count model that accommodates overdispersion, even with fixed effects, is that of Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) wherein the dependant variable is assumed to be distributed as a negative binomial and the individual effect is distributed beta. We attempted to estimate the negative binomial model as well; however, as is common with this procedure (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998), none of our estimations converged.
19 To our knowledge, Terza's (1998) is the only known endogenous treatment correction for count data. As in our model, Terza's procedure assumes that the dependent variable is distributed bivariate Probit estimator (with 33/50 participation). In all cases, we find no statistical evidence for cross-equation correlation. 20 Although we lag 33/50 releases, there is also the potential for their endogeneity; however, in statistical tests, we do not reject the null of exogeneity in any of the models. 21 We therefore proceed under the maintained hypothesis that lagged releases and lagged participation regressors are exogenous. Table 4 presents selected results from estimation of the participation equation. We present three models. 22 The first is a parsimonious specification, Poisson, with a random effect that is normal. However, for our purposes, a drawback of this estimator is that it assumes an observation-specific random effect, rather than the firm-specific effect that we posit in this paper. Our measure of boycott sensitivity (BC) also has a positive impact on participation, one that is statistically significant in our "exhaustive" Model III but not in Model II. Similarly, our measure of prior (1988-90) release reductions (DIFREL) has a positive impact on participation, but a statistically significant one only in Model III. This positive effect implies that firms which have smaller prior reductions in releases were more likely to participate in the 33/50 program, perhaps because they had more to gain from programmatic technical assistance; hence, we do not find evidence for "free-riding" as a motive for participation. Finally, we do not find evidence that program participation was spurred by either liability law (with insignificant coefficients on STRICT and STRICT-LEMP) or incentives for "green marketing" (with statistically insignificant prior actions has a statistically insignificant coefficient. Hence, our data suggests that having had a prior enforcement action was an important driver of 33/50 participation, but the number of actions was not.
V. RESULTS

1) The Participation Equation.
effects of proximity to final consumers, FG, and its interaction with pollutant releases, FG-RELEASE).
(2) The Pollution Equation. For all model variants, the coefficient on the augmented inverse Mills ratio (calculated using fitted values from our Model III participation estimation, per note 13) is statistically significant, indicating sample selection from program participation decisions in the expected direction.
We find that firms' participation in the 33/50 program lowered their pollution, reaffirming Khanna and Damon's (KD, 1999) findings. These pollution reductions are statistically significant in the first year of program operation (1992), but persist throughout our sample period (to 1995).
Moreover, these estimated effects are robust to a variety of model specifications, to alternative estimation methods, and to alternative measures of releases (toxicity-weighted and unweighted).
And they are large in magnitude. Based on Table 7 cumulative reduction in a facility's inspections by 1995. 26 These impacts are robust to alternative models and estimation methods, and do not appear to weaken with the addition of correlates.
We find significant negative effects of 33/50 participation on enforcement actions as well.
Participation effects are significant at the program's inception (1992) and its end (1995); in the intervening years (1993 and 1994), we estimate that participants enjoyed much smaller reductions in enforcement rates (Table 7) . Overall, a firm's 33/50 participation is estimated to spur a 44 percent cumulative reduction in the likelihood of enforcement action by 1995.
Our results also indicate that larger firms (with higher LEMP) tend to be inspected more, but have fewer enforcement actions, most likely because heightened inspection oversight promotes greater compliance, thus vitiating the need for enforcement action. Due to similar logic, state air quality spending spurs more inspections but, perhaps due to improved compliance, fewer enforcement actions.
In addition, we find that prior enforcement actions spur subsequent (follow-up) inspections and that prior inspection activity is positively associated with subsequent enforcement actions, likely because inspections are one key precursor (among others) for the identification of 26 Marginal effects in Table 7 only account for the direct impact of 33/50 participation on inspections / enforcement actions. For inspections, there is an additional indirect effect, with participation lowering releases (Table 5 ), which in turn lowers inspections (Table 6 ). The approximate cumulative indirect effect of 33/50 participation is to reduce inspections by a further 6.4 percent by 1995 (based on the fixed effects model of Table 5 and the Poisson inspection model of Table 6 ). For enforcement actions, we find no indirect impact of participation, with a coefficient on lagged releases (LRELFAC) that is statistically insignificant.
infractions. 27 Other precursors for enforcement actions can be local community and environmental group reports. Environmental groups can also apply political pressure for government action against facilities that they target. Due to either or both of these effects, we find that larger local environmental constituencies (as measured by SIERRA) have a positive effect on enforcement actions. Inspection rates are estimated to rise with boycott sensitivity (BC), but fall with the Sierra Club measure. Hence, it appears that general environmental group influence in a community substitutes for government inspections in promoting environmental objectives, but that government authorities respond to the visibility of potential boycott targets by inspecting with greater frequency. 28 27 However, enforcement actions need not derive from inspections. For example, community groups can alert authorities to infractions. Hence, we find in our data that the proportion of time facilities experience enforcement actions when they have no inspections (.0656) is almost the same (and not significantly different statistically) as when they have inspections (.0861). We therefore do not treat a facility's enforcement action as a selection from the sample of facilities that are inspected in a given year.
28 One might conjecture that environmentalism may spur pressure on government agencies for more inspections; our results suggest, in contrast, that government agencies recognize the salutary effects of environmentalism on firm performance and therefore reduce their inspection rates when there is more environmentalist pressure. Similar logic may explain why our "right to work" variable has a significant positive effect on inspection rates. Specifically, right to work states are likely to be pro-business, with constituencies that may impose little community pressure for environmental performance; government authorities may compensate for this lack of community pressure by exercising more regulatory oversight.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied why firms chose to participate in the EPA's voluntary 33/50 pollutant reduction program; effects that this program had on firms' pollution; and effects of program participation on subsequent government enforcement activity. In doing so, we find empirical support for the "enforcement theory" of voluntary pollution reductions (Maxwell and Decker, 2006) . Specifically, program participation involves firm investments in environmental auditing and technology that lowers their pollution abatement costs and thereby prompts pollution Our results thus reaffirm Khanna and Damon's (1999) conclusion that the 33/50 program spurred pollutant reductions, while accounting for time and other effects omitted there. However, we estimate that the size of these impacts was much larger than found by KD, and that they occurred primarily in the first year of the 33/50 program's operation. Relative to the literature, we also identify new impacts of the 33/50 program, estimating that participation reduced rates of environmental inspection and enforcement action by cumulative percentages of 26 and 44 percent, respectively. And by accounting for a broader range of economic phenomena than prior work, our estimations document new economic forces driving 33/50 participation, including incentives to forestall potential boycotts by environmental groups (Baron, 2001; Innes, 2006) and/or to preempt lobbying by these groups for tighter environmental regulation and enforcement (MLH, 2000) .
However, contrary to earlier studies that did not account for these forces (e.g., KD, AC, VA), we do not find support for the hypothesis that firms participated in the 33/50 program, and/or reduced their pollution levels, in order to obtain "green marketing" advantages -that is, consumer (price) premia for goods produced in an environmentally beneficial way (AC, AG). NOTES: The dependant variables are INSPECT and ENFORCE. All models include industry dummies (for SICs 28 and 33-38). A linear restrictions (LM) test favors the time variable (year) to year dummies in all models. "*", "**", and "***" indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
